To what are citizens mobilized? The ends of political mobilization broadly defined could include all varieties of political action-conventional and unconventional. The focus here is on conventional electoral and party organizational activities.
How might political parties contribute to political mobilization? Mobilization might be stimulated by party organizations' activities as well as those of their affiliated candidates and the impetus provided by distinctive party ideologies. Competitiveness among the political parties in a set of overlapping, office-based constituencies and party differences on policies significant to sets of issue publics could also mobilize party activists and the electorate. Hill and Leighley (1993) find that party competitiveness and ideology are significantly related to turnout but that party organizational strength is not. Furthermore, in those states with restrictive voter registration requirements, only party competitiveness is significantly related to turnout.
The extent to which mobilization occurs through non-party processes and the extent to which mobilization by political parties occurs and is necessary are questions which require more research.
1 The issue could also be raised as to whether mobilization by political parties, with their broader focus and more encompassing coalitions, is preferable to mobilization by interest groups, with their usual focus on one or a few issues.
Electoral Mobilization
Turnout in American elections, at all levels of government, has declined significantly since its high point in the 1890s. In examining turnout, the electorate can be divided into three types based on their frequency of voting: core voters who vote in most or almost all elections; marginal voters who cast ballots only in response to the stimulus of strong short-term forces; and non-voters who do not vote even in the presence of strong short-term forces (Kleppner 1982) . Estimating the proportion of the electorate in each category, Kleppner concluded that core voters as a proportion of the nonsouthern electorate declined from approximately two-thirds in the 1876-1890 period to approximately 48 percent during the 1960-1978 period. The proportion of the non-southern electorate classified as marginals remained the same, while non-voters increased from 15.6 percent to 34.6 percent. In the South, the core declined from 48.2 percent in 1876-1890 to 30.9 percent in the 1960-1976 period. During that same span, southern marginal voters decreased from 22.7 percent to 17.4 percent of the electorate while nonvoters increased from 30.4 percent to 51.5 percent (Kleppner 1982, 24 [ Table 2 .5]).
Turnout has declined since the 1960s, reaching a low of 57.4 percent of the voting age population in 1988.
2 Although the level of turnout appeared to rebound slightly in the 1992 presidential elections, voting participation in the United States remains substantially lower than in earlier periods of American history and than occurs in other developed democracies.
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How can the demobilization of the American electorate, evident since the 1890s, be explained? A number of alternative explanations have been suggested. One is that the realignment of the 1890s left the control of both political parties in the hands of interests unrepresentative of important segments of the electorate (Burnham 1970 (Burnham , 1982 . While the range of choices proffered to the electorate is more limited than that offered in multiparty systems, certainly other factors affect levels and patterns of political participation. Legal and institutional factors related to the voter registration and election administration processes inhibit turnout in the United States (Hill and Leighley 1993; Powell 1986; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1982; Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987) .
The militant style campaigns conducted when electoral turnout reached its highest levels in the United States were replaced by an advertising style with the advent of the third party system in the 1890s (Jensen 1968 , cited in Burnham 1970 . Those party organizations most effective in utilizing the militant mobilizing style of campaigning employed systematic canvassing to identify supporters, then worked to register those supporters and ensure that they voted. Although the militant style generally evaporated from the American scene, as late as the 1950s it persisted in some areas of traditionally strong political party organization, such as Indiana, Illinois, and Massachusetts. 4 Socio-demographic changes contributed to the continuing demobilization of the American electorate during the post-World War II period. Increased geographic mobility, changed employment and residential patterns, decreased involvement in religious institutions, and changed life styles occurred, creating the potential to significantly alter, disrupt, or reduce citizens' social networks (Conway 1991; Milbrath and Goel 1977; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1982) . To the extent that political mobilization occurs indirectly through social networks and neighborhood contexts (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) , reduced political mobilization might be the expected outcome of changed social network patterns. A changed age distribution, with a greater proportion of younger voters who are less likely to vote for a variety of reasons, also contributed to the decline in voting participation (Miller 1992) . Increased educational attainment failed to offset the dampening effect of other social changes on turnout Nagler 1992a, 1992b; Miller 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Squire, Wolfinger, and Glass 1987; Conway 1991; Teixeira 1992; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980) . Changes in psychological orientations to politics may also have affected the mobilization of the mass electorate. Beginning in the 1960s, significant declines occurred in the citizens' beliefs in governmental institutions' responsiveness to citizen concerns and interests as well as in their trust and confidence in governmental institutions. A concurrent decline occurred in citizens' psychological involvement in politics. However, researchers disagree on the extent to which a cause and effect relationship exists between changed patterns of attitudes and changes in turnout patterns (Conway 1991; Jackman 1987; Miller and Traugott 1989; Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Miller 1980 Miller , 1992 Powell 1986; Teixeira 1992; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993) .
Political Parties' Mobilization Activities
To what extent has the level of party mobilization activity changed? In what ways has it changed? The measurement of change in both levels and types of party political mobilization activity requires baseline data, and baseline measures of the parties' mobilization activities are limited in availability and restricted as to party units examined and years covered.
As party organization strength increased, party mobilization activities would be expected to increase. Several studies have examined the strength of party organizations at one or more points in time. One national study presents data collected in 1979-80 through a survey of county chairs (Cotter, Gibson, Bibby and Huckshorn 1984) . Comparisons with earlier and later periods suggest a recent trend toward the strengthening of county level party organizations (Beck 1974; Beck and Sorauf 1992; Gibson, Cotter, Bibby, and Huckshorn 1985; Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz 1990; Gibson, Cotter, Bibby, and Huckshorn 1983; Gibson, Frendreis, and Vertz 1989) . Stronger party organizations would be expected to contribute to political mobilization both directly through campaign activities and indirectly through running candidates for local office even in areas where the party is not competitive (Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz 1990) .
While party organizations are stronger and report more activities, the perception exists that political parties are less effective in mobilizing members of the electorate. The electorate's reports of political party mobilizing contacts do not parallel the trend in increased party organizational strength, as Table 1 indicates. Reported party mobilization contacts during presidential elections increased from 17.3 percent in 1956, reaching a high point of 29 percent reporting such contacts in 1972. Then the proportion of the electorate reporting such contacts declined, dropping to 20.1 percent in 1992. In midterm elections, the high point of party contacting members of the electorate occurred in 1982, with 31 percent reporting party contacts during the campaign, and then the proportion reporting such contacts declined, falling to 19 percent in 1990. Potential voters' reported contacts with party mobilization agents may have declined because because party organizational strength is not translated into effective political mobilization. These generalizations about trends in party organizational strength and levels of party mobilizing through contacting potential voters are based on several different data sets. A better test would be provided by matching indicators of party organizational strength to reported party mobilizing efforts and turnout patterns in specific locales. Note, however, that Hill and Leighley (1993) report that party organizational strength is not related to turnout. 1956 1960 1964 1968 1972 1976 1980 1984 1988 1966 1970 1974 1978 1982 1986 1990 It may be that the mobilizing activities engaged in are not as effective as those used by party organizations in earlier political eras. The decline in effective performance of the political mobilization role would have significant consequences for election related participation. Indeed, a substantial body of research indicates that party mobilizing activity has a small but significant impact on electoral outcomes. In competitive elections, the impact on the outcome could be decisive (Cutright and Rossi 1958; Frendreis, Gibson, and Vertz 1990; Katz and Eldersveld 1961; Kramer 1970-71; Crotty 1971; Price and Lupfer 1973; Wolfinger 1963 ).
The problem may also be one of conceptualization. For example, Huckshorn (1983, 1984) viewed party organizational strength as composed of two dimensions: organizational complexity and developed programmatic capacity. Programmatic capacity is defined by that group of scholars as having two components-institutional support activity and candidate-directed activity. An electoral mobilization program is just one of the five components of institutional support activity. Thus, a party organization could be strong in many components of the organizational strength measure, yet be weak in electoral mobilization. 
Incentives to Act as Political Mobilizers
Traditionally, party organizations mobilized individuals not only to vote but to staff and run political campaigns and contribute to the ongoing work of the party organization. Both the mobilizing agent and the mobilized responded to rewards provided by the party system. Research examining party activists evaluates the relative role of material, purposive and solidary incentives for engaging in party work. The evidence suggests that the most frequently cited initial stimulus to party work is purposive incentives. That body of research also indicates that for many activists the incentives which stimulate initial activism may be different from those which sustain activism, with social incentives becoming more important as involvement in party work continues over time (cf. Burrell 1986; Clark and Wilson 1961; Hofstetter 1973; Feigert 1968, 1974) . Which incentives specifically motivate such traditional mobilization activities as canvassing to identify supporters, conducting registration drives, and stimulating turnout on election day in a variety of types of political environments has received limited attention. The general conclusion drawn from both academic and journalistic discussions of the decline of party organizations is that the rewards desired are no longer provided by the party organization as effectively as they are by candidate campaign organizations. Research comparing patterns of activism and the incentives for activism among party workers and candidate campaign workers would add to our knowledge of the incentives sought and obtained for initial and continuing activism in different types of political mobilization organizations. Also needed are longitudinal analyses of activism, such as those carried out by Eldersveld (1986) and Marvick (1986) , and of the extent to which activists specialize in working just for the party organization or for candidates.
Solidary rewards may motivate some volunteers, but others may be motivated by support for a candidate or a cause. Only limited research examines the conditions and reward structures under which party volunteers can be motivated to engage in various forms of voter mobilizing activity or the extent to which such activities make a difference in turnout or vote choice. Both field experiments, carefully structured, and survey research could be used to collect data appropriate to testing hypotheses about motivation to mobilizing activity and the effectiveness of its various forms.
This discussion has assumed that the rewards sought and received for mobilizing activity are selective, accruing to the individual. However, rewards can be collective, as when an organization which perceives one party or set of candidates as more favorable to its policy preferences engages in electoral mobilization activities. Labor unions are often credited with that role for some local Democratic party organizations, through such activities as contacting union members through union phone banks or providing volunteers to staff party canvassing activities. The general impression is that this type of mobilizing activity by labor unions has declined both with the decrease in union membership and the tendency during the 1980s for many union members to vote in opposition to union leaders' candidate endorsements.
We lack sufficient information about the levels and trends in the use of collective versus selective incentives to energize members of various types of organizations-union, religious, business, or single issue-to mobilize segments of the electorate. Incentives may vary depending on whether the segments to be mobilized are geographically designated or selected on the basis of membership in a particular organizaton. Also lacking is adequate information about the effectiveness of such mobilizing activity.
Incentives for Responding to Mobilization Efforts
What rewards induce or reinforce mobilization of those who are the targets of the mobilizing efforts? Anticipated rewards from voting could be instrumental, such as the prospective enactment and/or implementation of preferred policies. For example, anti-abortion groups can mobilize expected supporters to campaign and to vote in order to defeat pro-abortion legislators (Hershey 1984) . While it is easier for single issue groups to target potential supporters and for single issue voters to anticipate the policy outcomes if their views prevail, political parties are by their very nature coalitions, with a spectrum of policies being advocated. Individual voters may prefer some policies advocated by a party but not others. The party must then mobilize selectively, emphasizing either valence or position issues, or targeting particular issue positions to specific segments of the electorate. Selective mobilization of the electorate can occur directly, through targeting groups in the electorate or geographic areas, or indirectly by seeking to activate for political persuasion purposes the social networks within groups in order to mobilize their members. The effects of various kinds of targeting are presumed to be effective, as parties and candidates continue to engage in such activities, but rigorous research which evaluates the effectiveness of various targeting strategies is limited (for exceptions see Gertzog 1970; Cain and McCue 1985) .
Changes in Mobilization Processes
One alternative to party mobilization is self-mobilization. Greater reliance on self-mobilization would be expected with increased educational attainment, direct access to information through both print and electronic sources at a relatively low cost of time and effort, and perceived relevance of government decisions and policies (Dalton 1988) . Increases in educational attainment set the stage for a substantial increase in turnout in the United States, but other factors have more than offset that change (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Teixeira 1992) . Self-mobilization could also be stimulated by a heightened concern with a particular issue present in the campaign, strong support for a candidate, or a perceived significant difference in the impact of alternative election outcomes. While substantial research has focused on the role of issues in vote choice, the role of issues in mobilizing voters and the conditions under which political parties, as opposed to other mobilizing agents, can use issues to mobilize segments of the electorate merits more research.
Political participation is highly correlated with use of print media. However, reliance on print media as a source of political information declined substantially from 1960 to 1988 (Teixeira 1992) . 7 Significantly, campaign efforts to mobilize votes rely heavily on electronic media. The relative effectiveness of message delivery through electronic versus various forms of print media, including brochures and direct mail, merits further study.
Changing Techniques of Political Party Mobilization
Instead of having to use in-person contacts to mobilize electoral support, technological developments facilitate use of electronic media in political mobilization activities. One form is using phone banks to contact selected members of the electorate and request support for a candidate or slate of candidates. Use of phone banks is more efficient in that it centralizes vote support solicitation and permits specifically targeting known party supporters. What, if any, increment or decrement in turnout this form of approaching voters provides as compared to that derived from more personal approaches is unknown. The relative efficacy of this activity, even if targeted to frequent voters, versus the old fashioned in-person request for a vote has not received adequate study.
An even less personal approach is to drop candidate and party literature at the front door of registered voters. While material is provided which, if read, would convey a limited amount of information about the party and/or its candidates, little is known about to the extent to which distributed material is read or the information contained in distributed campaign brochures is effective in mobilizing turnout or motivating vote choice.
The mobilizing processes employed by campaigns in the current era represent responses to the changes in the social environment, campaign fund raising techniques, and the regulation of campaign finance. New mobilization techniques employ a variety of types of electronic technology used for both campaign fund-raising and campaign message delivery.
The decline of the political party's traditional political mobilization function may be attributable in part to its failure to adapt to changes in communications technology as well as to the previously discussed changes in its social and political environment. Political communication techniques have evolved from historic patterns of person to person appeals, propaganda in partisan newspapers and printed broadsheets and the use of yard signs and party or candidate leaflets to phone banks, radio ads and talks, to television ads, to the use of televised town meetings, appearances on entertainment programs, and the television "infomercial."
Republican efforts during the 1980 campaign to place blame for the nation's woes on the Democrats and instill knowledge about which party controlled the Congress through extensive broadcasting of television commercials which closed with the slogan "Vote Republican, For a Change" demonstrated that using generic television advertising can be successful in increasing the public's information levels. However, more recent successful use of lengthy televised political communications represents a major change in campaign techniques. Used extensively in the 1992 national presidential campaigns, the infomercial provides a mechanism of mass political communication which successfully reduced reliance on indirect political mobilization through party and interest group networks. It maximizes direct political mobilization and at the same time enhances the likelihood of political mobilization through indirect, personal social networks as a consequence of viewers discussing what they have seen and heard both with other viewers and with non-viewers.
In 1992 the use of infomercials to communicate directly with the electorate, by-passing the press, party organizations, and interest groups, was evident in several phases of the electoral cycle. It was present in former California Governor Jerry Brown's appeals for both primary votes and money during the Democratic Party's presidential nomination contest, in eventual winner Bill Clinton's search for votes during the fall presidential campaign, and in Ross Perot's brief candidacy and post-election efforts to establish "United We Stand America" as a third force in American politics. With its emphasis on issues which resonate with a significant proportion of the public and with its vehicle being the pronouncements of a leader who addressed the issues and proffered what were to many viewers acceptable solutions to them, the infomercial reached a substantial proportion of the electorate. Its use continued after the election: messages conveyed by Ross Perot's infomercials were sufficiently convincing to attract an estimated million members to United We Stand America by April, 1993. 8 The 1992 presidential campaign provides evidence that the technique of direct mobilization through television infomercials can be used successfully by candidates in national campaigns. Could this technique be used successfully in political party directed mobilization efforts? The success of infomercials appears to be based on focusing on a few problems, presenting them in a manner that makes them salient to the citizens, providing solutions to the problems which are believable to the audience, and suggesting a proposed action response in which audience members can easily engage. Given the mass public's generally lukewarm evaluations of the political parties (Miller & Traugott 1989, 119-124) , using the infomercial format to appeal for broad support of a political party's candidates is less likely to be successful. However, party supported and/or funded infomercials on behalf of candidates, focusing on highly salient issues of wide concern among the electorate, and presented by a positively evaluated political leader, might be successful.
Could infomercials and entertainment and talk show appearances be successfully used as mobilizing devices in smaller political arenas, such as a statewide contest, a congressional race, or campaigns for local offices? The low budget format certainly makes these formats financially feasible, but other constraints could inhibit their use. Electronic media markets rarely match political constituencies. While the fit would be best for state-wide contests, even for these the feasibility may be limited where media markets overlap several states.
An alternative to be pursued, then, becomes reliance on broadcasting on local television stations and local cable television systems, but the difficulty presented is the absence of a large audience for public affairs programming on these media. Given the relatively low rates for advertising on cable systems as compared to other broadcast media, political infomercial advertising via cable television systems could become a financially feasible communications tool, provided that it proves to be successful in mobilizing sufficient numbers of citizens. Certainly political candidates have discovered the cost effectiveness of advertising on selected cable channels. Research is needed to assess the effectiveness of political mobilization efforts employing alternative electronic communications formats in a variety of political contexts and broadcast over a variety of alternative telecommunications formats. However, expected future changes in the technology of electronic media may present significant barriers to their use by political parties to mobilize the electorate. These anticipated changes include a great increase in the number of cable channels available through cable systems, broadcast of viewer-selected programs at times chosen by the viewer through local phone and cable companies or through miniaturized satellite receivers which make possible direct receipt of selected programs, bypassing both the cable system and the phone company. What happens, then, to direct political mobilization through the electronic media? These new transmission methods could result in the electorate avoiding both traditional ads and infomercials.
Mobilization Processes in Different Types of Settings
Institutional arrangements affect the extent to which incentives exist for political parties to engage in mobilization activities. Where citizens perceive that their vote will have an impact, party mobilization efforts are more likely to be successful. Such perceptions are more likely to be created by institutional structures used in other nations. Cross national research indicates that nationally competitive districts, greater proportionality in translation of votes into seats, multi-party systems, and unicameral legislatures are related to increased voter turnout. These institutional arrangements increase the citizens' perceptions of the potential impact of their vote, directly increasing turnout. Such conditions also make it easier for political leaders to convince citizens of the importance of their vote (Jackman 1987) .
Another institutional factor, the voter registration system, affects both the political parties' use of mobilization activities and their relative success. Variations among states and also within states in ease of access to the registration process has undoubtedly affected the parties' mobilization activities. The extent of use of alternative mobilization techniques in different registration environments and their effectiveness has received limited attention.
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While mobilization efforts are strategically targeted as a function of the resources available to the party and the chracteristics of those targeted, systematic knowledge is lacking about the effects of contextual conditions on mobilization methods used and their effectiveness.
The Role of Parties in Political Mobilization
A changed environment has to some extent altered methods used in efforts to mobilize those members of the electorate who are expected to vote for the party's candidates. The changed environment may also have altered the relative contribution to the mobilization of the electorate which the party makes and which it potentially can make. The increased importance of candidate organizations, the role of interest groups and political action committee in financing campaigns, changed methods of mass communications, and a number of socio-demographic changes affect the role of political parties as mobilizing agents. Adequate understanding of the consequences of these changes for political parties' performance of political mobilization activities requires further research.
NOTES
1 Analyzing the sources of decline in voter turnout in the United States between 1956 and 1988 in presidential elections, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) attribute half the decline to decreased political mobilization. However, only one political mobilization measure is explicitly a measure of party activity (being contacted by a party).
2 Estimates of the level of voting participation vary with the data source being used. Using 1992 as an example, post-election surveys by the U.S. Bureau of the Census estimate that 61.3 percent of the eligible electorate voted in 1992. In the University of Michigan's National Election Study post-election interviews, 75.8 percent of those interviewed reported voting. Using as a base ballots cast for the office of president, Curtis Gans of the Center for the Study of the American Electorate estimates that 55 percent of the voting age population voted in 1992.
3 Among the developed democracies only Switzerland has a lower voter turnout than the United States. For discussions of the causes of low levels of Swiss turnout, see Jackman (1987) , Powell (1982) , and Przeworski (1975) . 4 See, for example, Crotty's (1986) study of Chicago area party leaders' reported mobilization activities in the 1980 campaign. 5 Their research used the measure of party organizational strength developed by Cotter, Gibson, Bibby, and Huckshorn (1984) . 6 For an example of some discrepancies between aspects of party organizational strength and political mobilization activities, see Hopkins' (1986) study of party leaders in Davidson County, Tennessee.
7 As Teixeira notes, problems exist in developing and analyzing measures of newspaper readership in campaigns using the American National Election Studies data because the response alternatives to questions tapping newspaper readership have changed significantly over time. Despite this problem, a pattern of decline in use of print media occurred. See Teixeira (1992, 44 [ Table 2 .5]) for the pattern which occurred, as well as his discussion of the measure used in his analysis (1992, 217 [Appendix C]) . 8 As of 6 April 1993, data on the number of members in United We Stand America had not been released. However, a poll by the Gordon Black polling firm indicated that as of late March, 1993 , approximately 20 percent of those interviewed indicated that they would be willing to pay $15 to become members of the organization. 9 For an exception, see Knack (1993) .
